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PURPOSE AND EFFECTS: VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATORY
CLOSURE OF A DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM
Kerry L. Monroe*
In early 2010, amidst a series of racially charged incidents on campus, the stu-
dent government president at the University of California at San Diego revoked
funding to all student media organizations in response to controversial speech on
the student-nn television station. It is well established that once the government
has opened a forum, including a "metaphysical"forum constituted by government
funding for private speech, it may not discriminate based on the viewpoints ex-
pressed within that forum. However, it has not been clearly established whether the
government may close such a forum for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose. This
Note argues that courts should hold viewpoint-discriminatory closures unconstitu-
tional because: (1) government action motivated by the desire to silence a
particular viewpoint is inconsistent with core principles underlying the First
Amendment, and (2) even facially neutral actions motivated by illicit purposes
tend to have unconstitutional discriminatory effects.
INTRODUCTION
In February 2010, the University of California at San Diego
("UCSD") was engulfed in controversy surrounding a ghetto-
themed student party called the "Compton Cookout," which was
thrown to mock Black History month.' Not only were many UCSD
students and faculty offended by the party's theme, civil rights lead-
ers and state and local political leaders spoke out against the party as
well.2 During the week following the party, an editor of The Koala,' a
controversial UCSD student "humor" newspaper, broadcast a
* Associate, Technology and Media Law, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC;
University of Michigan Law School,J.D., magna cum laude, 2010; University of Georgia, B.A.,
1998. I would like to thank Professors Don Herzog, Len Niehoff, and Steve Sanders for
countless hours of discussion with me of First Amendment issues and for their valued com-
ments on this Note, as well as Professor Richard Primus for his mentorship and for
introducing me to the field of Constitutional Theory. I am also grateful to the members of
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, in particular Robert Smith, for their
helpful edits. Finally thank you to my loving husband, Charles, for supporting me in writing
this Note and in all my life endeavors and my beautiful daughter, Danielle, for waiting until
most of the edits on this Note were done before making her entrance into the world.
1. Larry Gordon, College "Ghetto"Party is Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at AA1,
available at 2010 WLNR 3384037.
2. Id.; U. C. San Diego Freezes Funds for 33 Media Groups, Dissolves Student TV, Threatens to
Punish Students for Protected Speech, FIRE (Feb. 23, 2010), http://thefire.org/article/
11597.html.
3. THE KOALA ONLINE, http://www.thekoala.org (last visitedJan. 28, 2011).
985
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
defense of the party on UCSD's Student Run Television ("SRTV") .
In the broadcast, the editor used the phrase "ungrateful n***ers,"
further fueling racial tensions on campus.
In reaction to the broadcast, UCSD student government presi-
dent Ustav Gupta took immediate action to shut down SRTV,
explaining that "[w] e will only open [SRTV] again when we can be
sure that such hateful content can never be aired again on our stu-
dent funded TV station."6 Mr. Gupta also unilaterally froze funding
for the other thirty-two UCSD student media organizations, in-
cluding fashion magazines, online academic journals, and various
newspapers." These media organizations were all funded by student
fees collected by the university, and funding was allocated by a stu-
dent council headed by Mr. Gupta.9 In halting funding for these
organizations, Mr. Gupta stated that he was compelled to act be-
cause The Koala editor's expression was "fracturing ... the student
body on an issue." Approximately three weeks later, the council
voted to end the moratorium on funding for student media, and
made no changes to the current policy governing student media."
Although UCSD's funding freeze was not a permanent end to
funding student media organizations, Mr. Gupta's actions raise an
important question: may a government actor shut down a desig-
nated public forum for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose? The
Supreme Court has never decided this question, and the few lower
courts that have done so have answered in different ways. This
4. Daniel Reimold, Racial Slur Leads to Student Media Funding Freeze at UCSD, COLL.
MEDIA MATTERS (Feb. 24, 2010), http://collegemediamatters.com/2010/02/24/racial-slur-
leads-to-student-media-funding-freeze-at-ucsd/.
5. Id.
6. U. C. San Diego Freezes Funds, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. Student Organization Media Final Allocations-Spring 2010, ASSOCIATED STU-
DENTS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://as.ucsd.edu/finance/docs/FinalAllocMediawilO.04-15-10-16-
22-28.pdf.
9. Angela Chen, Funds Restored to Student Press, THE UCSD GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2010),
http://www.ucsdguardian.org/news/funds-restored-to-student-press/.
10. U.C. San Diego Freezes Funds, supra note 2; see also UCSD TV Show Mocking Blacks
Sparks Freeze, CBS 8 (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.cbs8.com/Global/story.asp?S=12030737.
11. Victory for Freedom of the Press: UC San Diego Ends Unconstitutional Funding Freeze, FIRE
(Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.thefire.org/article/11648.html.
12. The temporary nature of the funding freeze at UCSD should not bear on its con-
stitutionality. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (noting that the
temporary nature of a prior restraint does not reduce the severity of the constitutional inju-
ry); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."); see also N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black,J., concurring) ("[E]very mo-
ment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant,
indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment.").
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Note argues that closing a designated public forum for a viewpoint-
discriminatory purpose is unconstitutional.
Part I examines the case law surrounding public forums and
viewpoint discrimination and surveys federal court decisions dis-
cussing the circumstances under which the government may close
a designated public forum. Part II argues that courts should hold
unconstitutional government closure of these forums for view-
point-discriminatory purposes. First, Part II.A reasons that the
illicit purpose of viewpoint discrimination alone renders such clo-
sures unconstitutional because this restriction of speech is
inconsistent with core principles underlying the First Amendment.
Part II.B argues that the propensity for discriminatory purposes to
cause discriminatory effects provides an additional basis for finding
viewpoint-discriminatory closures unconstitutional. This section
also discusses the inadequacy of using an effects-based standard or
looking to the facial neutrality of a closure to determine the clo-
sure's effects. Finally, Part III addresses concerns raised by some
scholars and judges regarding the relevance, in the First Amend-
ment context, of government purpose to an action's
constitutionality, demonstrating that the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly shown its willingness and competence to hold unconstitutional
government actions motivated by discriminatory purposes.
1. THE LAW SURROUNDING CLOSURE OF
A DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM
Over the last seventy years, federal courts have developed an ex-
tensive body of case law concerning the permissibility, under the
First Amendment, of regulating speech in public spaces. When
government-owned property is held open for private expression, it
is termed a "public forum," and the government must adhere to
particular principles of neutrality in regulating expression within
the forum. While content restrictions are constitutionally permissi-
ble in certain public forums, the government must refrain from
discriminating against speakers or speech based on the viewpoints
expressed within all public forums. However, the Supreme Court
has not yet addressed the issue of whether government actors must
adhere to this principle of viewpoint neutrality when they com-
pletely close a public forum to private expression. The lower courts
that have addressed the question are split in their responses.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
A. An Overview ofPublic Forum Doctrine
In Hague v. CIO, the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the ex-
istence of quintessential public forums, those public spaces that
have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."3 The most common examples are parks and streets.
Within a traditional public forum, the government may impose
only reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner re-
strictions on speech. 4 For example, a reasonable time restriction
would be closing a city street to demonstrations during rush hour,
if the presence of a demonstration would place an intolerable bur-
den on traffic.'5 The city could not, however, close the street to all
demonstrations all the time.' 6 The latter restriction would not be
neutral with regard to the content of speech in the forum, since a
particular type of speech, demonstrations, would be targeted.
In addition to traditional public forums, the government may
open its other properties for expressive use by part or all of the
public, thereby creating "designated public for[ums]" subject to
the same limitations on speech regulation as in traditional public
forums. 7 For example, a school may designate a particular bulletin
board as available for postings by any member of the public, creat-
ing a designated public forum in that space.
A designated public forum is considered a "limited public fo-
rum" when it is established for a particular purpose.'8 In a limited
public forum, restrictions on use by certain speakers or for discus-
sion of certain subjects are permitted in furtherance of that
purpose. ' For example, a school bulletin board may be limited to
postings related to a particular academic subject taught at the
school, say history. In that case, the bulletin board would be con-
sidered not just a designated public forum, but specifically a
limited public forum. While content restrictions may be imposed
13. 307 U.S. 496,515 (1939).
14. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
15. Id. at 115-16 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965)).
16. See id. at 116 ("Subject to such reasonable regulation, however, peaceful demon-
strations in public places are protected by the First Amendment.").
17. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (recognizing that designated
public forums come in both limited and unlimited varieties).
18. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[The] limited public forum
is a subset of the designated public forum." (quoting Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v.
Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004))).
19. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-)7 (2001).
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on access to a limited public forum, viewpoint discrimination, con-
sidered an especially egregious form of content discrimination, is
never permitted in any type of public forum.20 Thus the school in
the bulletin board scenario could not deny use of the bulletin
board to those who wish to post historical information about the
Civil War from a pro-secessionist perspective, while allowing its use
to those who post similar information from a pro-Union perspec-
tive.
The principles governing regulation of speech in limited pub-
lic forums are not limited to physical forums, but have also been
applied where the forum exists "more in a metaphysical than in a
spatial or geographic sense."' In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia, a variety of student extracurricular activi-
ties related to the university's educational purpose were funded by
student fees paid into the university student activities fund. The
Court analogized the student activities fund to a limited public fo-
rum, holding that the university's refusal to pay for the publication
of a student newspaper because of its religious editorial perspective
23is impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. South-
worth, the Court again applied forum analysis principles by analogy
to a public university student activities fund. In Southworth, the
Court held that the First Amendment permitted the university to
charge its students a mandatory activity fee to fund various expres-
sive activities. However, in regard to a referendum process
through which the student body apparently voted on whether par-
ticular student organizations received funding, the Court indicated
that the government cannot constitutionally subject access to a des-
ignated public forum to a vote if doing so substitutes majority
determinations for viewpoint neutrality.26
20. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995). As
an example of the distinction between a content-based restriction and a viewpoint-based
restriction, the Court distinguished religion as a subject matter (content) from a religious
perspective on other subject matters, such as child-rearing (viewpoint). Id. at 830-31.
21. Id. at 830.
22. Id. at 823-24.
23. Id. at 830-31.
24. 529 U.S. 217, 229-30 (2000). The Southworth Court did not discuss whether the
student activities fund was analogous to an "unlimited" designated public forum or to a
limited public forum. However, that distinction is irrelevant to the analysis, since viewpoint
neutrality is required in all public forums. See infra Part II.B.
25. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
26. Id. at 235.
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B. Viewpoint Neutrality
Under the First Amendment, the "government may not grant the
use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny
use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views."" This principle arises "from the most basic values underlying
the First Amendment," including "the right to think, believe, and
speak freely, the fostering of intellectual and spiritual growth, and
the free exchange of ideas necessary to a properly functioning
democracy."28 Nearly seventy years ago, in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, Justice Jackson proclaimed, "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein." 29 Later Supreme Court
decisions reinforced this sentiment, condemning regulations "aimed
at the suppression of dangerous ideas,, 0 "proscribing speech ...
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed,"3  or "driv[ing]
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."
The government discriminates based on viewpoint when it regu-
lates speech based upon agreement or disagreement with the
33particular position on an issue the speaker wishes to express.
Viewpoint-discriminatory regulation carries a heavy presumption
of unconstitutionality. The Court has typically described viewpoint
discrimination as flatly prohibited, rather than calling for a height-
27. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
28. Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 100 (1996-
1997) (citing, among others, "C. EDWIN BAKER, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN LIBERTY (1989)
(positing that the First Amendment's primary purpose is advancement of human liberty);
THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 7 (1970) ('[Free expression]
carries beyond the political realm. It embraces the right to participate in the building of the
whole culture, and includes freedom of expression in religion, literature, art, science, and
all areas of human learning and knowledge . . . .'); . . . LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 13-22, at 785-89 (1978) ('[T]he Constitution's most majestic guarantee'
(free speech) cannot be understood 'in purely instrumental or purposive terms.'); ...
Susan H. Williams, Content Discimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615,
676-94 (1991) (defining First Amendment values to include pursuit of truth, proper func-
tioning of a democracy, fulfillment of human potential, self-expression, tolerance, and
encouragement of dissent)").
29. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
30. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958).
31. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
32. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167, 176 (1976).
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ened level of scrutiny.3M As the Fourth Circuit stated, "[t] he ban on
viewpoint discrimination is a constant." " However, courts address-
ing the issue of whether a regulation is viewpoint-discriminatory
have most often considered cases in which a regulation explicitly
favored one side or another.3 6 The outcome is less certain when the
government enacts a regulation that is neutral on its face (i.e., does
not explicitly target a specific viewpoint) but which was nevertheless
enacted for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose (i.e., is implicitly
aimed at silencing a particular viewpoint).
C. Closing a Designated Public Forum
The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of when the
government may close a designated public forum altogether. In
particular, it has never addressed whether a state actor may close a
forum to everyone in order to silence a certain viewpoint. The few
lower federal courts that have addressed the issue have responded
in various ways. Some courts have held or otherwise stated that the
government may not close a designated or traditional public forum
for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose. Others have stated or im-
plied that a government actor may close a public forum regardless
of its purpose for doing so.
34. See, e.g., RA. V., 505 U.S. at 391 ("The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored sub-
jects."(emphasis added)); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984) ("[T]he first amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that
favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."(emphasis added)); Police Dep't of
Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content." (emphasis added)).
35. Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062,
1067 (4th Cir. 2006). But note that there are certain pockets of contemporary First Amend-
ment jurisprudence in which regulation that could be characterized as viewpoint-
discriminatory is permitted. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002)
("The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech,
including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real chil-
dren.").
36. Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper Leg-
islative Purpose, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31, 76 (2003) ("Only if the language of the law
itself reflects the viewpoint-or content-discriminatory reasons underlying its enactment does
the Court apply heightened scrutiny.").
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1. Supreme Court Dicta on Closing Public Forums
In two cases, the Court has noted in dicta that the government
has the authority to close a traditional and designated public fo-
rum, but the Court has never specifically discussed the
circumstances under which the government may do so. In Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, the Court
stated that "[a]lthough a state is not required to indefinitely retain
the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by
the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum."0 In In-
ternational Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, Justice Kennedy
stated in his concurrence that, "[i]n some sense the government
always retains authority to close a public forum, by selling the
property, changing its physical character, or changing its principal
use." However, in neither Perry nor Lee did the Court proclaim
that the government may close public forums "whenever it wants,"
despite the willingness of some lower courts to infer such authori-
ty.39 While, in a temporal sense, the government is "not required to
indefinitely" maintain a forum and "always retains authority" to
close the forum, it does not necessarily follow that the government
may do so whatever its motivation.
2. Cases Supporting the Proposition That the Government
May Not Close a Designated Public Forum for
a Viewpoint-Discriminatory Purpose
Three panels of federal judges, from two U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal, have stated in dicta that the government may not close a
designated or traditional public forum for a viewpoint-
discriminatory or content-discriminatory purpose. Note that, since
viewpoint discrimination is a form of content discrimination,4 a
finding that content-discriminatory closure of a designated public
forum is unconstitutional necessarily indicates that viewpoint-
discriminatory closure is also unconstitutional.4 1
37. 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
38. 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedyj, concurring).
39. See, e.g., Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 728 (9th Cir. 2004).
40. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 ("Viewpoint
discrimination is . .. an egregious form of content discrimination.").
41. However, a finding that content-discriminatory closure of a designated public fo-
rum is constitutional would not necessarily mean that a viewpoint-discriminatory closure is
similarly constitutional. A court may uphold a content-discriminatory closure by reasoning
that since the government may impose a content restriction on a designated public forum
(thereby converting it into a limited public forum, a type of designated public forum, as
992 [VOL. 44.4
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In Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, a non-profit
corporation and a church brought suit against a public transporta-
tion authority when it refused to display the plaintiffs'
advertisements. 4 The First Circuit found that the transportation
authority's advertising program was not a designated public forum,
but stated that, even if the defendant had previously intended "to
maintain a designated public forum, it would be free to decide in
good faith to close the forum at any time."4 Similarly, in United States
v. Griefen, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[i]f a closure of a public
forum is for a valid rather than a disguised impermissible purpose,
the potential for self-imposed or government censorship . .. does
not exist;"44 closing a portion of national forest to allow for road
45
construction was not an impermissible purpose.
Citing Griefen, the Ninth Circuit upheld the closure of parts of
downtown Seattle in Menotti v. City of Seattle after finding no im-
permissible motive. The Menotti Court found that the city's
purpose in issuing an emergency order prohibiting access to por-
tions of downtown during an international trade conference was
restoration and maintenance of civic order.4 ' The court held that
this purpose was content and viewpoint neutral.48 While the court's
inquiry into purpose may have been less than searching or its con-
ception of viewpoint-neutrality unduly limited, the court
nonetheless explicitly recognized that reasons for closing a public
forum must be viewpoint-neutral.
In addition to these three circuit court cases, several federal dis-
trict courts have indicated that there are limits on the
government's ability to close public forums. ACT-Up v. Walp, decided
by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, is
the only published decision as of this writing in which a court has
actually held unconstitutional the closure of a designated public fo-
rum due to the government's content-discriminatory purpose.
discussed in Part LA), it may instead close the forum for a content-based reason. See, e.g.,
infra Part I.C.3, (discussing cases relying on similar reasoning). But the same court might
hold that a viewpointdiscriminatory closure is unconstitutional because the government may
never impose a viewpoint restriction on any public forum. See infra Part II.B.
42. 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
43. Id. at 77.
44. 200 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 2000).
45. Id. at 1260-62.
46. 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005).
47. Id. at 1129.
48. Id. at 1128-30.
49. This has proven to be a controversial decision. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Displac-
ing Dissent: The Role of "Place" in First Amendment jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587
(2007).
50. 755 F. Supp. 1281 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
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Together with all visitors, the plaintiff, an AIDS-awareness organi-
zation, was denied access to the gallery of the Pennsylvania House
of Representatives during the governor's State of the Common-
wealth address.' Given the State's admission that it had closed the
gallery specifically to prevent the plaintiff access, the court ap-
plied strict scrutiny to hold the forum closure an impermissible
content-based restriction.
More recently, in the highly publicized McMillen v. Itawamba
County School District, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Mississippi cited ACT-Up in finding a substantial likelihood
54
of a First Amendment violation. After denying an openly gay stu-
dent's requests to wear a tuxedo and bring a same-sex date to her
high school prom-and receiving a demand letter from the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union-the school cancelled the prom. The
court recognized that the student "intended to communicate a
message by wearing a tuxedo and to express her identity through
attending prom with a same-sex date," and found that the motive
behind the school's cancellation of prom was to deny the student
the chance to communicate that message at the school-sponsored
event. 6 The court held that the student's First Amendment rights
had therefore been violated. Although the court did not expressly
categorize the prom as a designated public forum, the court's reli-
ance on ACT-Up and the substantially similar facts make McMillen
relevant to the discussion of impermissibly closing public forums.
Two other district courts have stated in dicta that closing public
forums with viewpoint-discriminatory purpose is impermissible.
First, in Rhames v. City of Biddeford, a provider of programming for
public access television sued a municipality, claiming that a tempo-
rary shutdown violated his First Amendment rights." The U.S.
District Court for the District of Maine deemed it unnecessary to
decide whether to apply public forum doctrine, but stated that if it
were to apply the doctrine, it would treat the public-access station
as a designated public forum. 59 The court went on to state that the
51. Id. at 1284. The gallery was deemed a limited public forum. Id. at 1287-89. As not-
ed in Part I.A, supra, a limited public forum is a type of designated public forum. See Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
52. ACT-Up v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1289 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
53. Id.
54. McMillen v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 699 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (or-
der denying preliminary injunction).
55. Id. at 701-02.
56. Id. at 705.
57. Id.
58. 204 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D. Me. 2002).
59. Id. at 52.
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government could not temporarily or permanently shut down a
designated public forum for viewpoint-discriminatory reasons."
Deciding that the plaintiff had not shown any likelihood of proving
viewpoint-discriminatory motive, the court denied the plaintiffs
request for a temporary restraining order.
Second, in Initiative and Referendum Institute v. United States Postal
Service, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted
summary judgment for the postal service, holding that even if post
office property was a public forum, a regulation preventing groups
from gathering petition signatures on postal service property was a
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.2 However, in an ear-
lier decision between the parties, the court noted the
impermissibility of closing a public forum for a discriminatory
purpose: "The government may close a public forum that it has
created by designation ... so long as the reasons for closure are
not content-based."63
Finally, employing reasoning quite distinct from the other cases
discussed in this section, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan has indicated that, while government purpose
alone should not determine the permissibility of an action, imper-
missible effects resulting from an action motivated by an illicit
purpose could render the action unconstitutional. In Thomason v.
Jernigan, the City of Ann Arbor vacated the public right of way in
and around the cul-de-sac in front of a Planned Parenthood clin-
ic.63 Recognizing that it "should not engage in a search for the
motives of legislators, but for an inevitable unconstitutional effect
resulting from their actions," the court held that Ann Arbor's clo-
sure of the traditional public forum was an unconstitutional
content-based regulation; anti-abortion protests were the "conduct
60. Id. at 53 ("It is true that a city should not be able to shut down a park or a band-
shell temporarily so as to avoid a particular speech or a particular concert-that is not a
viewpoint neutral measure and violates the First Amendment.").
61. Id. at 53-54. See also id. at 51 ("Certainly if Biddeford were to shut down the public
access channel temporarily so as to stifle discussion of a particular current controversy, with
plans to reopen the channel later after the controversy had subsided, or so as to stifle the
particular speech of this plaintiff, that shutdown would be speaker and viewpoint censorship
and would violate the First Amendment under any analysis.").
62. 297 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D.D.C. 2003). The D.C. Circuit reversed this grant of sum-
mary judgment for the Postal Service but did not address the issue of whether the regulation
was a viewpoint-discriminatory closure of a public forum. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 417 F.3d 1299 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
63. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 116 F. Supp. 2d 65, 73 (D.D.C.
2000).
64. Thomason v.Jernigan, 770 F. Supp. 1195,1200 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
65. Id. at 1196.
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and traffic problems" targeted by the city." Thomason thus supports
the proposition that content-or viewpoint-discriminatory closure of
public forums is unconstitutional, at least to the extent the plaintiff
can demonstrate an unconstitutional discriminatory effect.
3. Cases Supporting the Proposition That the Government
May Close a Designated Public Forum for a
Viewpoint-Discriminatory Purpose
Other federal courts have indicated that the government may
close a designated public forum for a viewpoint-discriminatory
purpose. Perhaps the best known of these cases are two in which a
municipality or state closed a forum in order to prevent groups
from putting up religious displays. In each case, the court held that
refusing the display within the forum when it was open was uncon-
stitutional, but nonetheless stated that the government may
constitutionally shut down a public forum to prevent religious dis-
plays.
In Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, Georgia denied the plain-
tiff permission to display a Chanukah menorah in the rotunda of
the state capitol.7 The State claimed that the First Amendment Es-
tablishment Clause required denying the request." However, the
Eleventh Circuit held that allowing the plaintiffs to display a meno-
rah in the rotunda would not violate the Establishment Clause.69
Furthermore, the court held that the State's exclusion of the dis-
play was an impermissible content-based restriction on a
designated public forum." Nonetheless, the court noted that the
State, fearing an Establishment Clause violation, could avoid the
perception that it was endorsing religion by closing the forum al-
together." Since refusal of the display was characterized as a
content-based, rather than viewpoint-based, restriction Miller does
not necessarily support the proposition that a designated public
forum may be closed for a viewpoint-discriminatory reason. It is
conceivable that the court could have held that viewpoint discrim-
ination, as a more egregious form of content discrimination, is not
a permissible reason for closing a public forum. However, given
66. Id. at 1200-01.
67. 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993).
68. Id. at 1385.
69. Id. at 1393.
70. Id. at 1394-95.
71. Id. at 1394.
72. See supra note 41.
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the fine and sometimes blurry distinction between content- and
viewpoint-discrimination, and the courts' propensity to view dis-
crimination against religious speech as viewpoint discrimination,
Miller likely supports the constitutionality of viewpoint-
discriminatory closures of public forums.
In Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority
("Grossbaum Il"), the defendant building authority revised one of
its rules to prohibit all private displays in the lobby of the city-
county building." The Seventh Circuit held in a previous appeal
that the building authority's prohibition of a menorah display "be-
cause of its religious perspective" violated the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment.7 5 Following that decision, the authority
issued a new policy prohibiting all private displays, rather than
prohibiting only religious ones. In the second appeal, the Seventh
Circuit held that the decision to close the forum was content-
neutral, therefore viewpoint-neutral, and constitutionally permissi-
ble." Although this particular forum was considered "nonpublic,"
the court went on to question whether motive was a germane
inquiry even in decisions to close public forums, 78 indicating that a
regulation that was facially neutral and had "some semblance of
general applicability" would be considered content-neutral.
73. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
74. 100 F.3d 1287 (7th Cir. 1996).
75. Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1290 (7th Cir.
1996) (Grossbaum II) (citing Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Bldg. Auth., 63 F.3d
581 (7th Cir. 1995) (Grossbaum l)).
76. Id. at 1290-91.
77. Id. at 1299. The plaintiff had conceded for the purposes of its preliminary injunc-
tion motion that the lobby was a nonpublic forum. Id. at 1297.
78. Id. at 1298-99. For this argument, the Seventh Circuit relied on Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 783-95
(1995) (Souter,J., concurring). See Grossbaum II, 100 F.3d at 1298-99. In that opinionJustice
Souter wrote that a State "could ban all unattended private displays in [the forum] if it so
desired." Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 783 (SouterJ., concurring). The Seventh Circuit's reli-
ance on Justice Souter's concurring opinion, however, was misguided. First, Justice Souter
did not clearly argue that the State could ban all private displays in direct retaliation against
a particular group's expressive message. Second, even ifJustice Souter did imply that such a
retaliatory ban would be constitutionally permissible, it is not clear that "[e]ight members of
the Courtjoined behind [this] proposition." Grossbaum II, 100 F.3d at 1298-99. Justice Scal-
ia, writing for the majority in Capitol Square and cited by Justice Souter for support, merely
noted that "speech which is constitutionally protected against state suppression is not there-
by accorded a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the State. The right to use
government property for one's private expression depends upon whether the property has
by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum . . . ." Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at
761 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia said nothing about closing a public forum to all unat-
tended private displays in order to silence particular speakers.
79. Grossbaum H, 100 F.3d at 1298 n.10.
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In a third case in this line, DiLoreto v. Down Unified School District
Board of Education, the Ninth Circuit cited both Miller and Gross-
baum II for the proposition that the government is free to close a
limited public forum regardless of the circumstances."o In DiLoreto,
the court held that a school board's refusal to accept for display on
the fence of a baseball field an "advertisement" depicting the Ten
Commandments, for fear of violating the Establishment Clause,
was simply the result of a reasonable content restriction on a lim-
ited public forum.8 ' The court further held that the school board
was not prohibited from closing the forum in response to the
plaintiffs advertisement." The court's brief discussion of the clo-
sure indicates that it did not find inquiry into the government's
purpose to be relevant where a forum is completely shut down.
There are two other more recent cases in which courts have ad-
dressed this issue. In Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa
Monica, the Ninth Circuit dismissed as moot a challenge to an or-
dinance through which a city closed a designated public forum by
limiting street banners to those put up by the city itself. The
plaintiff in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs had challenged a previous
version of the city ordinance, which provided exceptions for some,
but not all, private speech."5 Little is known about the plaintiffs
initial suit and the subsequent factual history. However, reading
between the lines, it appears that the city revised the ordinance
after that suit to close the forum to all private speech, in order to
avoid having to let all viewpoints be represented in the forum.
The court cited Ninth Circuit precedent stating that the govern-
ment may close a designated public forum "whenever it wants,"
and held that since the ordinance had been amended to complete-
80. 196 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 969.
82. Id. at 970.
83. Id. ("Closing the forum is a constitutionally permissible solution to the dilemma
caused by concerns about providing equal access while avoiding the appearance of govern-
ment endorsement of religion .... Accordingly, the fact that the District chose to close the
forum rather than post Mr. DiLoreto's advertisement and risk further disruption or litiga-
tion does not constitute viewpoint discrimination.").
84. -450F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006).
85. Id. at 1031-32.
86. Id. ("As Food Not Bombs recognizes, the February 24, 2004 amendments to the
street banner ordinance render the original challenge to that ordinance-premised on the
distinctions drawn by providing exceptions for some private speech but not others-no
longer viable. By precluding all private parties from putting up street banners and limiting
such "bannering" to the City itself, the Council has now closed the designated public forum
in which appellants sought to exercise their rights.").
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ly close the designated public forum, the challenge was no longer
viable.
That same year, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia decided American Civil Liberties Union v. Mineta.8" In Mineta,
the court held that the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (WMATA) could constitutionally close a designated public
forum in order to refuse advertisements advocating legalization of
marijuana, a restriction the court recognized as viewpoint-
discriminatory.88 The court specifically stated that viewpoint
restrictions within a designated public forum are impermissible,
but altogether closing the forum with a viewpoint-discriminatory
purpose is permissible. 0
As this overview illustrates, the case law regarding the circum-
stances under which a designated public forum may be closed is
conflicting and largely undeveloped. Some courts hold, or simply
assume, that the government must act in good faith when closing a
forum. Others find that the government's purpose is irrelevant and
that closing a public forum is always permissible. Part II undertakes
to resolve this doctrinal uncertainty. It concludes that closing a
public forum for viewpoint-discriminatory reasons should always be
impermissible.
II. PURPOSE AND EFFECTS
There are three principal ways in which government action
might violate the Constitution.' First, the government might
87. Id. (citing Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 728 (2004)). In Currier, in dicta unrelat-
ed to the disposition of the case, the Ninth Circuit stated that the government could close
designated public forums "whenever it wants," erroneously relying on Perry Education Associa-
tion v. Perry Local Educator's Association. Currier, 379 F.3d at 728. See discussion of Perry in Part
I.C.1, infra.
88. 319 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2004).
89. Id. at 83.
90. Id. at 83 n.4 ("The question at issue here, however, is not whether WMATA can
constitutionally prefer one viewpoint over another-the presumption is that it cannot-but
whether WMATA can close itself as a designated public forum and thus constitutionally
refuse to accept the advertisements in question by eliminating entire categories of adver-
tisements. The answer is that it can."); see also id at 82 ("So long as a designated public
forum remains open, it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public fo-
rum, but 'a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility.'"
(citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))).
91. See Michael N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 CEO. L.J. 1, 21 (2001); see also Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONsT. COMMENT.
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engage in impermissible conduct by taking an action specifically pro-
hibited by the Constitution." For example, a state might deny
criminal defendants the full benefits of a jury trial in violation of
the Sixth Amendment.93 Second, government action might result
in impermissible effects.14 For example, a municipal law might violate
the Establishment Clause if it has the primary effect of promoting
or inhibiting religion.95 Finally, the government might act in fur-
therance of an impermissible purpose. There are examples from
many areas of constitutional doctrine that illustrate this point. Fa-
cially neutral statutes that have a disparate impact on a protected
class provoke heightened scrutiny under equal-protection law only
if they are adopted for the purpose of discriminating against the
class." A protectionist purpose is presumptively unconstitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause." A woman's right to abort a
nonviable fetus is violated by state action undertaken for the pur-
pose of placing a substantial obstacle in her way.99
A question remains regarding why we care about purpose in First
Amendment free speech doctrine. We might care about purpose in
and of itself. Under this theory, concern about purpose stems from
our expectation that the government adopt a neutral attitude to-
wards its citizens."'o We might instead (or additionally) care about
purpose because of "the predictable tendency of improperly moti-
vated actions to have certain untoward effects."'1 The sections that
follow explore these theories, arguing that (1) viewpoint-
discriminatory closure of a designated public forum is always
unconstitutional because government restriction of speech moti-
vated by an illicit purpose is inconsistent with core principles
underlying the First Amendment, and (2) our interest in avoiding
the unconstitutional effects of a regulation enacted with a view-
55 (1997); Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motivation, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95, 103 (1971). Of course, individual judges and
academics differ with regard to how much significance they give to each type of violation.
Some may argue that a particular type is irrelevant or cannot alone amount to a constitu-
tional violation. Berman, supra at 22-29.
92. Berman, supra note 91, at 27-29.
93. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
94. Berman, supra note 91, at 22-23.
95. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
96. Berman, supra note 91, at 23-27.
97. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
98. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); City of Phila. v.
NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617,627-28 (1978).
99. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
100. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 426 (1996).
101. Id.
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point-discriminatory motive requires that courts inquire into gov-
ernment purpose even where a regulation, such as the closure of a
forum, is facially neutral.
A. Illicit Purpose as a Constitutional Violation in and of Itself
The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause serves "the principle
that the government must treat all persons with equal respect and
concern." 0 2 As Professor Geoffrey Stone asserts, "the concept of
improper governmental motivation consists chiefly of the precept
that the government may not restrict expression simply because it
disagrees with the speaker's views."' According to Stone,
[A] ny effort of government to restrict speech because it con-
tains a "false" or "bad" idea is inconsistent with the three basic
first amendment assumptions: in the long run, the best test of
truth is "the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market"; in a self-governing system, the
people, not the government, "are entrusted with the respon-
sibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
conflicting arguments"; and, in our constitutional system, the
protection of free expression is designed to enhance personal
growth, self-realization, and the development of individual au-
tonomy.'o4
Viewpoint-discriminatory closure of a designated public forum,
no less than viewpoint discrimination within such a forum, under-
mines these core First Amendment principles. A government actor
shutting down the marketplace of ideas (or a venue within the
marketplace) to prevent disfavored speech demonstrates at least as
much disrespect for the autonomy and capacity of the people to
determine the merits of the disfavored idea as he would in exclud-
ing only that idea from the marketplace. If we, as a people, truly
102. Id. at 511.
103. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & MARY L.
REv. 189, 227 (1983).
104. Id. at 228. For additional arguments supporting the view that the Court has con-
sidered and should consider actions motivated by illicit purposes unconstitutional, see
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297 (1997);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV.
L. REv. 1274 (2006); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767
(2001); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARv. L. REv.
708 (2007).
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value the concept of viewpoint neutrality,o government actors
seeking to prohibit ideas with which they disagree cannot be per-
mitted to circumvent the proscription against viewpoint
discrimination by making their speech prohibitions sweep more
broadly. Therefore, courts, which already recognize the unconsti-
tutionality of viewpoint discrimination within designated public
forums, must not permit government actors to close such forums
in order to prevent the dissemination of "bad" ideas.
B. Unconstitutional Effects Arising from Discriminatory Purposes
Beyond our concern about the neutral attitude we expect the
government to adopt towards its citizens, we care about purpose in
First Amendment free speech doctrine because when the govern-
ment enacts even a facially neutral law with a bad purpose, there
tend to be discriminatory effects. Courts may not always be able to
discern these effects, particularly the large-scale effects, without
inquiring into purpose.
1. The Effects of Closing a Designated Public Forum for
a Viewpoint-Discriminatory Purpose
The closure of a public forum will typically be a facially neutral
action. More often than not, the government will not close a forum
by explicitly disfavoring a particular viewpoint. The closure of a
public forum will also be generally applicable. That is, it will apply
to all who are eligible to speak in the forum. Nonetheless, closing a
forum with a discriminatory purpose can have numerous adverse
effects on individual speakers, as well as a detrimental impact on
the interchange of ideas within the wider community.
a. Widespread Effects
When a designated public forum is closed for a viewpoint-
discriminatory purpose, all speakers participating in the forum lose
their expressive opportunity. But the impact, over time- and across
forums, will be substantially greater on those expressing the disfa-
vored viewpoints that motivated the forum closure. Forums in
which only favored viewpoints are expressed will tend to remain
105. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the widespread and long-standing recognition
of viewpoint neutrality as reflective of the basic values underlying the First Amendment.
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open, while forums in which disfavored viewpoints surface or pre-
dominate will be closed at a disproportionate rate. The net result
of these closures will be felt not only by speakers possessing disfa-
vored viewpoints, but by all of us, as our "marketplace of ideas"
loses its diversity and richness.
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment, beyond
protecting speakers, protects the rights of listeners as well. The
Court has referred to a First Amendment right "to receive infor-
mation and ideas," and has acknowledged that freedom of speech
"necessarily protects the right to receive.",06 Furthermore, the
Court and academics alike agree on the importance of the First
Amendment's protection of "unfettered interchange of ideas" to
the democratic process.'07 The systematic disadvantaging of particu-
lar viewpoints is a clear violation of these principles.
Furthermore, discriminating against a viewpoint by closing a
designated public forum has even broader effects than would a
viewpoint-based restriction within a forum. While a viewpoint-
based restriction silences disfavored speakers within a public
forum, closing a public forum silences everyone within that forum. If
the First Amendment is concerned with fostering the free ex-
change of ideas, it is difficult to see how closing a forum altogether
is constitutionally preferable to restricting viewpoints within it.
Both forms of action have the systematic effects described above
and the effects on the individual speaker described below.
b. Effects on the Speaker
Beyond the effects that may be felt by society as a whole, closing
a designated public forum for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose
has particularly keen effects on the speaker whose viewpoint is the
target of discrimination. Under First Amendment law, the govern-
ment may not retaliate against an individual for exercising her
constitutional rights.10 8 When a speaker voices her viewpoint in a
106. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757
(1976).
107. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
108. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996) ("The First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech protects government employees from termi-
nation because of their speech on matters of public concern." (citation omitted)); Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977) ("A borderline or
marginal candidate should not have the employment question resolved against him because
of constitutionally protected conduct."); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
("[The government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his consti-
tutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.").
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designated public forum, and as a result, the government revokes
her right to speak there, the government has retaliated against her.
This is equally true whether the government closes the forum or
revokes her access to the forum." While, conceptually, analysis of a
retaliation claim must be framed in part as a purpose inquiry (i.e.,
the government retaliates against someone when it acts with the
purpose to discriminate against the views she expressed), the ef-
fects on the individual speaker are clear:no As long as a speaker
participating in a forum expresses only viewpoints favored by the
government, she retains access to the forum; when she expresses a
viewpoint disfavored by the government, she loses access. From this
individual's perspective, the effect is the same when the forum is
closed as when the government imposes a viewpoint restriction on
the forum, something that is clearly constitutionally prohibited."'
The fact that the government could have closed the designated
public forum at any time is irrelevant. In Mt. Healthy City School Dis-
trict Board of Education v. Doyle, for example, an untenured teacher,
who "could have been discharged for no reason whatsoever," could
still "establish a claim to reinstatement if the decision not to rehire
him was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protect-
ed First Amendment freedoms."'12 This principle is not limited to
employment situations. In Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,
the Court held that the termination or nonrenewal of a pre-
existing commercial relationship in retaliation for the exercise of
protected speech, even where the government is entitled to termi-
nate the relationship for no reason at all, would violate the First
Amendment."' The Umbehr Court recognized that "the threat of
the loss [of a government benefit] in retaliation for speech may
chill [a recipient from speaking] on matters of public concern
. . . . This concern is strongly implicated in the context of a des-
ignated public forum, where a participant's speech may be chilled
for fear of losing the benefit of the forum.
109. Consider a familiar example from the elementary school context. A teacher may
keep the entire class in from recess to punish bad behavior by a few. The generally applica-
ble nature of this action does not lessen its impact as punishment of the misbehaving
children. In fact, it may enhance it.
110. See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of using purpose-based inquiries to determine
effects.
111. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Regents & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30
(1995).
112. 429 U.S. at 283-84.
113. 518 U.S. 668, 668, 674, 685 (1996).
114. Id. at 674.
[VOL. 44:4
Viewpoint-Discriminatory Closure
2. Looking to Purpose to Determine the Effects of Viewpoint-
Discriminatory Closures
Although viewpoint-discriminatory closure of a designated pub-
lic forum causes unconstitutional effects, those effects may be
difficult to ascertain without looking to purpose because judges are
not well positioned to evaluate when such effects, particularly
large-scale societal effects, have occurred. Similarly, evaluating the
facial neutrality of a closure is an inadequate measure of the un-
constitutional effects the closure is likely to have: the same
concerns regarding chilling speech and "driv[ing] certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace""'5 that underlie the constitution-
al prohibition against viewpoint discrimination apply equally
whether a government action is facially discriminatory or facially
neutral. In fact, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that it is suf-
ficiently concerned with potential viewpoint-discriminatory effects
arising from facially neutral regulations that it has invalidated fa-
cially neutral regulations that give government actors even the
opportunity to act with a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose.'"' There-
fore, courts should look to the government's purpose in closing a
designated public forum in order to determine whether unconsti-
tutional viewpoint-discriminatory effects are likely to arise.
a. The Inadequacy ofEffects-Based Standards
In order to prevent the effects of systematically disadvantaging
certain viewpoints, courts must consider the government's motiva-
tion in closing a designated public forum."' It is not feasible to
require courts to consider only the closure's effects in determining
unconstitutionality. As recognized by now-Justice Elena Kagan,
"[t] he problem with an effects-based standard is one of judicial ad-
ministration. The questions it forces judges to ask about what ideas
are over- or underrepresented, about who has talked too much or
too little, about when 'drowning out' has occurred, are not subject
to unbiased, reliable evaluation.""" And courts are ill-equipped to
115. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991).
116. See infra Part II.B.c.
117. Kagan, supra note 100, at 507 ("The reason to think about reasons has to do with
the likelihood that the consideration of certain reasons will systematically and predictably
lead to actions that have adverse consequences.").
118. Id. at 508-09.
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compare existing viewpoint diversity with what viewpoint diversity
may have existed but for a viewpoint-discriminatory forum closure.
The difficulty of discerning discriminatory effects using only an
effects-based standard is compounded by the potential cumulative
discriminatory effects resulting from multiple forum closures tar-
geting similar viewpoints. Consider that a court would typically
hear a case concerning the constitutionality of only a single closure
at a time; determining the societal impact of a single closure from
among the multitude would be nearly impossible. By contrast, a
court taking purpose into consideration when deciding the consti-
tutionality of a forum closure needs to look to the purpose
motivating only that particular closure in determining whether
viewpoint-discriminatory effects have occurred or are likely to oc-
cur.
Furthermore, assuming courts are able to determine discrimina-
tory effects, exclusively employing an effects-based standard would
require courts to wait until discriminatory effects have manifested
themselves before declaring a forum closure unconstitutional. This
is particularly problematic given the potentially widespread effects
of forum closures."" Many viewpoints may be lost for long periods
before this becomes evident to a court, and the marketplace of
ideas may never fully recover the diversity of thought it would have
had but for the viewpoint-discriminatory forum closure. Therefore,
rather than confining judicial inquiry to the effects of a forum clo-
sure, courts faced with closures of designated public forums need a
tool for effectively predicting whether a particular viewpoint is in
danger of being systematically disadvantaged. Considering the gov-
ernment's purpose in closing a forum can aid a court in preventing
unconstitutional effects from occurring from the moment the gov-
ernment acts with a discriminatory purpose.
b. The Inadequacy ofEvaluating Facial Neutrality in
Determining Unconstitutional Effects
Closures of designated public forums will frequently be facially
neutral actions, even when motivated by viewpoint-discriminatory
purposes.O Unlike viewpoint regulations within forums, which
must explicitly indicate what viewpoint cannot be expressed in or-
119. For a discussion of these widespread effects, see supra Part II.B.1.a.
120. As the events at UCSD demonstrate, however, government closure of public fo-
rums will not always be facially neutral. See supra Introduction.
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der to be followed,"' forum closures can be accomplished without
explanation. But just as effects-based standards inadequately safe-
guard against discriminatory effects, facial neutrality is an
ineffective predictor of discriminatory effects."' This can be illus-
trated by an example concerning access restrictions on a
designated public forum.
When the government is not required to provide a benefit, ei-
ther providing or not providing the benefit may be constitutional
at any given point in time."' For example, a State may, constitu-
tionally, allow public access to the rotunda of the state capitol only
when the state's budget allows for security guards to staff it."' How-
ever, allowing access to the rotunda may also be unconstitutional at
any point in time if the access results from a facially unconstitu-
tional regulation, such as one directing that the rotunda "will be
open to the public at times when conservative viewpoints predom-
inate and closed at times when liberal viewpoints predominate."'
Thus, either a facially constitutional or a facially unconstitutional
policy could have the same effect: a rotunda open or closed to pub-
lic access at any point in time.
However, laws are not unconstitutional "because of their effects
during any given time slice," but "because of their predicted effects
over an indefinite period of time."12 6 Thus, while denying public ac-
cess to the rotunda for budgetary reasons might exclude liberals at a
particular point in time, that action does not have an unconstitu-
tional effect. There is no reason to believe that, in the long run,
liberal viewpoints would be disadvantaged more than conservative
viewpoints when the government denies public access for budgetary
121. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Regents & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(striking down government action that treated differently a publication written from a reli-
gious perspective than other student publications).
122. See Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theory and Constitutionally Optional Benefits and
Burdens, 11 CONsT. COMMENT. 287, 300-02 (1994) (using a set of examples inspired by the
facts underlying Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), to explain why that case was
wrongly decided).
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(referring to designated public forums, the court explained that "a State is not required to
indefinitely retain the open character of the facility").
125. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
("Regulation of [a designated public forum] is subject to the same limitations as that gov-
erning a traditional public forum."); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972)
(stating that "reasonable 'time, place, and manner' " restrictions may be placed on a tradi-
tional public forum) (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941)); Police
Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("[G]overnment may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views.").
126. Alexander, supra note 122, at 302.
SUMMER 2011 ] 1007
1008 University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
reasons; the denial is wholly unrelated to the viewpoint of speech
expressed. But if the government passes its facially neutral access
regulation with the purpose of disadvantaging liberal viewpoints, we
can predict that in the long run, liberal viewpoints will be dispro-
portionately disadvantaged. 27 Thus, facial neutrality alone cannot
determine whether a regulation is neutral-and therefore constitu-
tional-in practice. In fact, government actors may be careful to
make regulations facially neutral specifically to mask their illicit
purposes, while still achieving their unconstitutional desired ef-
fects.' Rather, what predicts the unconstitutional effects of a
regulation is the purpose behind its enactment. Courts must inquire
into that purpose in order to adequately prevent unconstitutional
effects.
c. The Court's Willingness to Hold Unconstitutional Facially
Neutral Regulations Before the Regulations
Manifest Viewpoint-Discriminatory Effects
The idea that a facially neutral regulation can be found uncon-
stitutional if it fails to protect viewpoint neutrality finds support in
three Supreme Court cases involving regulations giving discretion
to majorities or individual decision-makers to determine who may
speak in a particular forum. In these cases, the Court demonstrat-
ed that it is concerned enough about potential discriminatory
effects arising from facially neutral regulations that it invalidated
these regulations because they gave government actors the mere
opportunity to act with a discriminatory purpose.
Southworth, discussed in Part I.A, supra, involved a referendum
process through which a student body voted on whether to fund or
defund particular student organizations." The Court found that to
the extent the referendum substituted majority determinations for
viewpoint neutrality, this process would fail to provide adequate
protection for the viewpoint neutrality principle.'" In Forsyth County
127. Id. ("Legislative motivation is what provides the assumption that all law will persist
over an indefinite period of time, so that its predicted effects over an indefinite period be-
come relevant. Because government's choice of an allocation of optional benefits is not
frozen by the Constitution and can always be changed, there is no basis other than motive
for assuming durability over time.").
128. See Chen, supra note 36, at 34 ("[T]he Court's free speech jurisprudence has been
driven almost blindly by its emphasis on overt discrimination.... [Tlhis has resulted in a
First Amendment jurisprudence that does not adequately restrain sophisticated, covert
forms of speech discrimination.").
129. 529 U.S. 217, 235-36 (2000).
130. Id. at 235.
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v. Nationalist Movement, the Court struck down an ordinance per-
mitting a government administrator to adjust assembly-permit or
parade-permit fees to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining
public order at the particular event."' The Court recognized that
this type of discretion "has the potential for becoming a means of
suppressing a particular point of view."1 2 Similarly, in City of Lake-
wood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., the Court struck down an
ordinance giving a mayor authority to grant or deny applications
for permits, recognizing that it gave the mayor "substantial power
to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by
suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers."1 3
The Court in Southworth, Forsyth County, and Lakewood recognized
that viewpoint discrimination might occur even where a govern-
ment body regulates without facially discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint. In the policies at issue in these cases, the discrimination
would probably occur at a later time, one step removed from the
issuance of the regulation.'" For example, under the Southworth
policy, actual discrimination would have occurred once the student
body had voted to defund an organization on the basis of the view-
point it expressed.3  Nonetheless, it was the facially neutral
regulation itself that the Court struck down, emphasizing its dedi-
cation to proactively protecting viewpoint neutrality. This was true
even where there was no indication or suspicion that the regula-
tion was passed to further a discriminatory purpose. 36
In each of these cases, the Court sought to prevent future ac-
tions motivated by discriminatory purposes-as well as the
discriminatory effects of those actions-from resulting from facial-
ly neutral regulations. Where the closure of a designated public
forum is involved, and the danger of viewpoint discrimination is
more imminent (rather than following from a potential discrimi-
natory action one step removed from the facially neutral
131. 505 U.S. 123, 123 (1992).
132. Id. at 130-31 (citation omitted).
133. 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988).
134. Of course, it is also possible that the government would issue such a regulation
with the purpose of discriminating, in which case we would have a situation even more simi-
lar to the topic at hand.
135. Another distinction between the policies at issue in Southworth, et al. and closure of
a public forum for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose is that under the policy at issue in
Southworth, any viewpoint-discriminatory action taken by the student body would itself prob-
ably not be generally applicable (i.e., it would likely defund a student group because of
disagreement with its message, not defund all student groups because of its disagreement
with one group's message). However, as discussed in Part II.B.1.b, supra, closing a public
forum for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose has unconstitutional effects despite being a
generally applicable action.
136. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
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regulation), courts must be at least as vigilant: closures of designat-
ed public forums for viewpoint-discriminatory reasons must be
held unconstitutional.
III. PURPOSE INQUIRY AND ITS CRITICS
There are those who question courts' willingness and compe-
tence to inquire into government purpose. For example, Professor
Alan Chen claims that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly rejected
direct judicial inquiries into legislative motive, even where there is
substantial evidence that a facially neutral law might have been
adopted for speech-restrictive reasons.,"' And Justice Antonin Scal-
ia argues that courts should not consider lawmakers' motives in the
First Amendment context, noting the difficulty of determining a
singular purpose of a collective legislative body.' 8
Additionally, in Palmer v. Thompson, a well-known Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection case with facts analogous to closing a
139designated public forum, the Supreme Court expressed concern
with the "futility" of striking down a law due to the government's
bad purpose when the law could be enacted again later when the
legislature re-passed it for different reasons.' The Court had ex-
pressed similar reasoning in the First Amendment free speech
context three years earlier in United States v. O'Brien.14' This Part
addresses these concerns. Section A discusses the Supreme Court's
increasing willingness to inquire into government purpose in First
Amendment cases and how it has done so through the use of doc-
trinal tests. Section B responds to claims of futility, demonstrating
that in the years since Palmer the Court has rejected this view, and
137. Chen, supra note 36, at 76.
138. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 557-60 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
139. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). In Palmer, the city of Jackson, Mississippi, chose to close its
swimming pools rather than desegregate them in response to a lower court judgment hold-
ing that state-enforced segregation was a violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 218-19. The Court held that closing the pools did not deny the African-
American plaintiffs equal protection, noting that the Constitution does not impose an
affirmative duty on a state to begin to operate or to continue to operate swimming pools. Id.
at 219-21.
140. Id. at 225. Note, however, that the Palmer Court did not acknowledge an impermis-
sible motivation for the city's actions; it found that there was substantial evidence that the
pools could not be operated safely and economically on an integrated basis. Id. at 224-25.
Thus, while some cite Palmer in arguing for the futility of purpose inquiry, Palmer does not
provide precedent for upholding an action where it has been clearly established that the
government has acted with a purpose to discriminate.
141. 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
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has instead recognized that a government action that would oth-
erwise be permissible can nonetheless be unconstitutional when it
has been enacted to further an impermissible purpose.
A. The Willingness and Competence of Courts
to Inquire Into Purpose
Contrary to the protestations of commentators like Professor
Chen,'4 ' and despite the fact that the doctrine tends to focus on
overt forms of speech discrimination, First Amendment free
speech doctrine can be viewed as a tool for revealing impermissible
government purposes. According to Professor Stone, a shift in con-
stitutional jurisprudence occurred under the Burger Court toward
an increasing emphasis on the government's motivation as a para-
mount constitutional concern.1
By the mid-1990s, now-Justice Kagan asserted that the discovery
of improper governmental motives had become the primary object
of First Amendment law over the past several decades.'" According
to Justice Kagan, the Court constructs and uses objective tests, such
as strict scrutiny analysis, to serve as proxies for direct inquiry into
motive. She argues that such rules, principles, and categories are
necessary to courts only because of the difficulty in directly deter-
mining government purpose in most situations.146 As a primary
example, Justice Kagan considered RA. V v. City of St. Paul, a case
in which the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that, as
it had been construed by the state supreme court, criminalized
fighting words based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender.1
The Court held that the city could not take this action because it
violated the principle of content neutrality; while a city may ban all
fighting words, it may not ban only fighting words that address a
particular subject or express a particular viewpoint.'4 8 According to
Justice Kagan:
142. Chen, supra note 36.
143. Stone, supra note 103, at 227.
144. Kagan, supra note 100, at 414.
145. Id. at 414, 443--505. See alsoJoN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUST 146 (1980)
("[F]unctionally, special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns
out to be a way of 'flushing out' unconstitutional motivation .. .
146. Kagan, supra note 100, at 415.
147. Id. at 416 (citing In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn. 1991)). The statute
at issue in R.A. V declared it a misdemeanor for any person to "place[] on public or private
property a symbol ... [wihich one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." St.
Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990).
148. 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
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The RA. V Court made this concern about illegitimate, censo-
rial motives unusually evident in its opinion, all but
proclaiming that sources, not consequences, forced the deci-
sion. The First Amendment, the majority stated, "prevents
government from proscribing speech ... because of disapprov-
al of the ideas expressed." And again: "The government may
not regulate [speech] based on hostility-or favoritism-
towards the underlying message expressed." The Court
maintained that the structure of the ordinance-the
subject-matter distinctions apparent on its face, the viewpoint
distinctions apparent in operation-suggested illicit motive
149
Justice Kagan notes that while such a thorough discussion of
governmental motive is unusual in First Amendment cases, R.A. V
reveals how a desire to punish impermissible purpose may explain
and animate the Court's elaboration of doctrine, even where the
motive inquiry remains hidden behind tests and categories.o50
More recently, Professor Jed Rubenfeld has argued that, under
"settled principles," an impermissible legislative motive can render
an otherwise valid law unconstitutional.'1' Professor Rubenfeld
argues that despite the fact that the Court in United States v.
O'Brien5 2 emphatically dismissed motive as irrelevant, the O'Brien
test itself is centrally concerned with purpose:15
[I]n deciding that Congress's "interest" in prohibiting draft-
card destruction was "limited to the noncommunicative aspect
of [the] conduct," the O'Brien Court distinguished a prior case
on the ground that the prior case involved a "statute ...
aimed at suppressing communication." Aim is of course a
synonym of purpose. If the ultimate question, then, as the
Court's own language suggests, is whether the statute in
question was "aimed" at punishing dissent, then the real
function of the O'Brien test is nothing other than ascertaining
the law's purpose."
As these scholars have argued, the Supreme Court's creation of
objective rules, categories, and principles to "smoke out" illicit pur-
149. Kagan, supra note 100, at 421.
150. Id. at 423.
151. Rubenfeld, supra note 104, at 775.
152. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
153. Rubenfeld, supra note 104, at 775-76.
154. Id. at 776.
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pose where direct purpose inquiry would prove difficult demon-
strates the Court's willingness to consider the government's
motivation a paramount constitutional concern. The use of these
tests expands courts' competence to determine when the govern-
ment has acted in furtherance of an illicit purpose. Thus, even
where a government actor has not made her motivation clear, courts
can employ doctrinal tests to strike down actions that functionally
distinguish between speakers based upon their viewpoints or subject
matter.
B. The "Futility" of Striking Down Actions Due to Illicit Purpose
Some academics, as well as the Supreme Court in Palmer, have
expressed concern regarding the "futility" of striking down
government action due to the actor's bad purpose.5 These critics
argue that it is futile to prohibit the government from taking an
action for one reason when the same action could later be taken
again for a different reason. But in the years since Palmer, the
Court has not adopted this reasoning, instead recognizing that a
government action that would otherwise be permissible can
nonetheless be unconstitutional when it has been enacted to further
an impermissible purpose.
For instance, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Court
struck down a display of historical documents, including the Ten
Commandments, because the history of the evolving display
showed that the County's predominant purpose in erecting the
display was not secular.15 7 Thus, rather than bemoan the futility of
striking down legislation passed with an impermissible purpose,
the Court relied on the history of religious motive to invalidate a
display that might have been found constitutional had it been
erected for a secular purpose.15
The Court's disregard of the futility argument in First Amend-
ment free speech jurisprudence is supported by Umbehr and Doyle,
155. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971); see, e.g., John Hart Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1214-15 (1970).
156. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225; Ely, supra note 155, at 1214-15.
157. 545 U.S. 844 at 873-74 (2005) ("In holding the preliminary injunction adequately
supported by evidence that the Counties' purpose had not changed . . . we do not decide
that the Counties' past actions forever taint any effort on their part to deal with the subject
matter. We hold only that purpose needs to be taken seriously under the Establishment
Clause and needs to be understood in light of context; an implausible claim that govern-
mental purpose has changed should not carry the day . . . .").
158. Id. at 874 (noting that the Court did not have "occasion here to hold that a sacred
text can never be integrated constitutionally into a governmental display on the subject of
law, or American history").
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the government retaliation cases discussed in Part II.B.1.b, supra.59
In Umbehr and Doyle, the Court held that even where the govern-
ment was not obligated to maintain an employment or commercial
relationship with an individual, it could not terminate the relation-
ship if it did so in reaction to that individual's exercise of
constitutionally protected freedoms.'6 The Court did not, as pro-
ponents of the "futility" argument would advocate it might, uphold
termination of the relationships by reasoning that it was futile to
prohibit the terminations since the defendant government actors
could terminate the relationships later for another, permissible
reason. Indeed, it is likely that had the defendants attempted a
second time to terminate the relationships without convincingly
establishing a new, legitimate purpose for doing so, the Court
would have again prohibited the terminations. Just as the
McCreary Court was not convinced by the government's efforts to
disguise its religiously motivated purpose in subsequent versions
of its Ten Commandments display, it is unlikely that the Court
would be satisfied by pretextual subsequent terminations by the
Umbehr and Doyle defendants.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether, even under modern
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine, Palmer remains
good law.161 In Washington v. Davis, the Court stated: "To the extent
that Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition that legisla-
tive purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our prior
cases . . . are to the contrary."' And in Hunter v. Underwood, the
Court, without reconciling Palmer, held that where "a neutral state
law .. . produces disproportionate effects along racial lines . . .
'[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'16
Therefore, whatever principle regarding the futility of inquiring
into government purpose may be derived from Palmer surely
should not extend to First Amendment public forum analysis.
Instead, courts should look to the principles underlying the well-
established ban on viewpoint discrimination and the Court's
demonstrated willingness to invalidate otherwise permissible gov-
159. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
160. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674, 685; Doyle, 429 U.S. at 283-84.
161. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963, 970 (N.D. Il. 1989) ("The Su-
preme Court has never expressly overturned Palmer, but it has all but done so. Time and
again over the past two decades, the Court has held that facially neutral laws may run afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause if they are enacted or enforced with a discriminatory in-
tent.").
162. 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.11 (1976).
163. 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985) (citation omitted).
[VOL. 44:4
Viewpoint-Discriminatory Closure
ernment actions taken for illicit purposes to find that closure of a
designated public forum for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose is
constitutionally prohibited.
CONCLUSION
Prohibiting the government from "prescrib[ing] what shall be
orthodox in . . . matters of opinion" lies at the heart of the First
Amendment." Closure of public forums for viewpoint-
discriminatory purposes substantially erodes that fundamental
principle. As the events at UCSD in 2010 demonstrate, courts must
find viewpoint-discriminatory closure of designated public forums
unconstitutional.
UCSD established a student organization fund ("the SOF") simi-
lar to those at issue in Rosenberger and Southworth. Various
expressive groups, including many media organizations, were fi-
nancially supported by this fund.'" Thus, it is reasonable to expect
that a court would characterize the SOF as, or analogize the SOF
to, a designated public forum.'67 Accordingly, current free speech
doctrine prevented UCSD, or any person acting on its behalf, from
discriminating within that forum on the basis of a speaker's view-
point.'68
However, current doctrine did not protect the forum from clo-
sure for a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose. In February 2010,
UCSD student government president Ustav Gupta explicitly ex-
pressed a desire to censor the racially motivated speech engaged in
by the editor for The Koala on SRTV."' He then froze all SOF fund-
ing to student media, apparently recognizing that only revoking
164. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
165. See ASSOCIATED STUDENTS FUNDING GUIDE 2009-2010, http://as.ucsd.edu/
finance/docs/ FundingGuide_09-10.pdf; ASSOCIATED STUDENTS MEDIA HANDBOOK 2009-
2010, http://as.ucsd.edu/finance/docs/AS_MediaHandbook_09-10.pdf (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
166. See ASSOCIATED STUDENTS: FINANCE-ALLOCATIONS, http://as.ucsd.edu/finance/
allocations.php (last visited May 5, 2010).
167. More specifically, it is likely that a court would deem the SOF a limited public fo-
rum, given that the fund is subject to speaker identity restrictions limiting it to student
organizations that agree to follow certain policies and procedures. See, e.g., Rosenberger v.
Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995) (analogizing a similar fund to
a limited public forum).
168. Id. at 828-37.
169. UC. San Diego Freezes Funds, supra note 2.
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funding for SRTV and The Koala would be a violation of those stu-
dents' free speech rights.o'0
That media freeze had impermissible disadvantaging effects on
individual speakers and detrimental effects on the interchange of
ideas within the student body at large. Mr. Gupta's retaliatory ac-
tion chilled The Koala and SRTV students' speech as much would
have any narrower, currently unconstitutional viewpoint restriction.
And Mr. Gupta silenced the rest of the students participating in the
forum as well, further diminishing the interchange of ideas on
campus. Student media organizations that could have presented
counterpoints to the views that triggered the freeze were unable to
respond, ensuring that, ironically, the disfavored speaker had the
last word in the debate.7
Recognizing the unconstitutionality of viewpoint-discriminatory
closure, however, would have prevented these effects. Mr. Gupta's
statements to the media indicate that he impermissibly acted based
on hostility toward the message expressed by the editor for The
Koala."' Under the reform proposed by this Note, that explicit,
viewpoint-discriminatory purpose would render what may other-
wise have been a constitutionally permissible action-freezing SOF
funding-unconstitutional.' 7 3 Thus, rather than closing the forum,
chilling debate, and stifling the interchange of ideas, all UCSD
speakers' free speech rights would have been protected.
While most of us may have little regard for the sentiments
against which Mr. Gupta discriminated, our regard for the First
Amendment and the principles it represents must counsel against
permitting viewpoint-discriminatory closure. The fostering of intel-
lectual and spiritual growth and the free exchange of ideas
necessary to a properly functioning democracy require that the
government maintain not only a neutral attitude toward its citi-
zens' views, but also a positive attitude toward encouraging public
debate. Our courts must, therefore, avoid establishing a rule of law
that would encourage government actors to silence everyone in
170. See Letter from Robert L. Shibley, Vice President, Found. for Individual Rights in
Educ., to Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor, Univ. of Cal., San Diego para. 3 (Feb. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.thefire.org/article/11612.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
171. See Editorial, Stopping the Presses Won't Heal the Hurt, THE UCSD GUARDIAN, Feb. 22,
2010, http://www.ucsdguardian.org/opinion/editorials/stopping-the-presses-won't-heal-the-
hurt/; Adam Goldstein, UCSD Media Funding Freeze Offends the First Amendment, HUFFINGTON
PosT (Feb. 25,2010,6:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-goldstein/ucsd-media-
funding-freezeb_477413.html.
172. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) ("The government may
not regulate ... based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message
expressed.").
173. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 100, at 414; Rubenfeld, supra note 104, at 768; Stone,
supra note 103, at 227.
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order to silence a few. Prohibiting viewpoint discrimination within
a forum, while permitting viewpoint-discriminatory closure of a
forum, would encourage exactly that. Thus, courts confronted with
situations like the media freeze at UCSD must hold that closing a
designated public forum in order to discriminate against a particu-
lar viewpoint is unconstitutional.
